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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet

which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstiiaZlchange in the very tissue of the law."-OLIvER WENDELL HoLmfs,
COLLEcTE LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 269.

Comments
ADMISSIBILITY IN A STATE COURT OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY WIRE-TAPPING

In the recent case of Schwartz v. Texas,' an accomplice of the petitioner, after
being in jail for about two weeks, consented to telephone the petitioner, and, with
the accomplice's knowledge, a device was set up which enabled an operator to record
the telephone conversation between the accomplice and the petitioner. The petitioner
was convicted of a crime in Texas on the admission into evidence of the telephone
conversation. A Texas statute2 provided that evidence obtained in violation of the
"Constitution of the United States" should not be admissible against the accused in
1. Schwartz v. Texas, 97 L.Ed. 157, 73 Sup. Ct. 232 (1953).
2.

TEx. CODE CRIM. PRocED. Art. 727a (Vernon's Tex. Stat. 1948).
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a criminal case. The petitioner contended, inter alia, that Section 605 of the Federal
Communication Act 3 prohibited the admissibility of the conversation into evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas upheld the conviction, 4 and the United
States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Minton, affirmed the Texas
Court. Mr. Justice Black concurred without opinion while Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurred in a separate opinion. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented.
For the first time the Supreme Court answers the question whether evidence
secured by a state official in violation of Section 605 bars a state from using such
evidence in a criminal trial.
At common law pertinent evidence, no matter how obtained, was admissible.
Apparently the theory being that a court would not stop to inquire into collateral
matter.5 However, in Boyd v. United States,6 by way of dictum, it was held that
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should not be admissible
at the trial.7 In 1913, in Weeks v. United States,8 the so-called federal rule was
firmly established. In the Weeks case the doctrine was laid down that evidence
secured by a search or seizure which was in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
if a motion to suppress the evidence was made before trial, was inadmissible, for
to admit the evidence would in effect nullify the value of the rights secured by
the Amendment.
In Burdeau v. McDowell,9 over a dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis (in which
Mr. Justice Holmes concurred), the Supreme Court held that, where a federal
governmental officer did not have a hand in illegally obtaining the evidence, it
could be admitted into evidence. This case was somewhat limited by Byars v.
United States,'0 where a federal agent participated with the state officer in a
wrongful search and seizure. The evidence was held to be inadmissible, for to allow
the evidence "would be to disregard the plain spirit and purpose of the constitutional
prohibitions intended to secure the people against the unauthorized official actioh."1"
In 1928, in a five to four decision, the Court, in the Olmstead case,1 2 through
Mr. Chief Justice Taft, held that wire-tapping was not an illegal search within
the Fourth Amendment.-3 The majority emphasized that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, historically, was to protect a man against illegal searches of material
things such as his home or papers, but that the Fourth Amendment was not meant to
48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. se . (Supp. 1946).
Schwartz v. Texas, 246 S.W. 2d 174 (Tex. rim. App. 1952), re. den.
2d 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183, p. 4 (3rd ed. 1940), and cases cited.
116 U.S. 616, 29 L.Ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886).
Professor Wigmore severly criticizes Boyd v. United States, supra note 6,
in 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2184, p. 31, stating that the case is ". . . incorrect
in its historical assertion, and [travels] ... outside the question at issue. ..
8. 232 U.S. 383, 58 L.Ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1913).
9. 256 U.S. 465, 65 L.Ed. 1048, 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 13 A.L.R. 1159 (1921).
10. 273 U.S. 28, 71 L.Ed. 320, 47 Sup. Ct. 248 (1927).
11. Id. at p. 33.
12. 277 U.S. 438, 72 L.Ed. 944, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 66 A.L.R. 376 (1928).
13. The decision is criticized by Robert L. Howard, Admissibility of Evidence
Obtained by Wire Tapping, 40 U. OF Mo. BuLL. L. SER. 13 (1928).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss2/2
3.
4.
246 S.W.
5.
6.
7.
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protect a person against the gathering of evidence by sight or by hearing. Justice

Holmes, Brandeis, and Butler wrote dissents. Holmes stated that the government
should not use evidence obtained by a criminal act.1 4 Brandeis felt that the Fourth

and Fifth Amendments should be interpreted more broadly than the strict meaning
given by Mr. Justice Taft. Thus, even though a federal agent violated a state law,
the evidence was admissible so long as it did not violate a federal constitutional
guarantee. "It is possible that the Court in the Olmstead case decided the issue in
favor of constitutionality in order to permit Congress to regulate wire tapping or
15
outlaw it in accordance with the rise or ebb of the crime wave.'
Perhaps in answer to the Olmstead case,16 Congress, in 1934, enacted Section
605, which reads in part: ". . . and no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, content,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person ... "
The words "no person" in Section 605 were construed in the first Nardone
case1 7 to include federal agents. The effect of this decision would seem to be that
Section 605 prohibts all persons, including state officers, from doing what is specifically prohibited in the act, not only in criminal cases, but in all proceedings at any
level.18 The second Nardone case19 broadened the effect of Section 605 by holding
that information indirectly secured from tapped messages was forbidden, and, in
1939, the Court held that it was immaterial whether the message was interstate
or intrastate.2° However, in Goldstein v. United States,21 in a five to four decision,
evidence was allowed on the theory that the defendant, not being a party to the
intercepted messages, could not object to its use. This holding would seem to be
somewhat inconsistent with the second Nardone case, supra. Section 605 was
construed in Goldman v. United States22 to apply only to messages in the course of
transmission, and hence it did not apply to a dictaphone (a device used in the
adjoining room to amplify sound in the other room), or to such other apparatuses
which did not directly intercept the messages.
In the recent case of On Lee v. United States,23 an acquaintance of the petitioner
entered the living quarters of the petitioner carrying a concealed transmitter. The
subsequent conversation was broadcast to a federal narcotics agent stationed outside
"Vitha receiving set. The Court in a five to four decision held the evidence admissible.
The majority reasserted the doctrines of the Goldman and the Olmstead cases.
14. The evidence was obtained in violation of a Washington Statute:
CODE

L.

PIERCE'S

§ 1876 (18) (1921).

15. Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 32 CORN. L.Q. 514, 531, 33 CORN.
WIRE TAPPING, ITS RELATION TO

Q. 73 (1948). To the same effect, see GREENAN,

CIVIL LIBERTIES

p.30 (1938).

16. But see Note, 53 HARv.L. REV. 863 (1940).
17. 302 U.S. 379, 83 L.Ed. 314, 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1937).

18.

GREENAN,

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

308 U.S., 338, 84 L.Ed. 307, 60 Sup. Ct. 266 (1939).
United States v.Weiss, 308 U.S. 21, 84 L.Ed. 298, 60 Sup. Ct. 268 (1939).
316 U.S. 114, 86 L.Ed. 1312, 62 Sup. Ct. 1000 (1942).
316 U.S. 129, 86 L.Ed. 1322, 62 Sup. Ct 993 (1942).
343 U.S. 747, 96 L.Ed. 770, 72 Sup. Ct. 967 (1952).

supra note 15, at p. 33.
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The dissent in the lower court 24 expressed the belief that there was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and, in addition, under McNabb v. United States2 and Anderson v. United States,26 which were to the effect that federal courts will not receive
evidence obtained in violation of federal or state laws, the evidence should have
been excluded. But the majority in the Supreme Court pointed out that there was
no violation of a federal law, and, even if there had been a violation of a state law,
the evidence would nevertheless be admissible under the Olmstead case. There was
no reference to the Anderson case.
In the instant case (the Schwartz case), the Texas statute27 provided that
evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States was inadmissible. The act had previously read that evidence obtained in violation of the
constitution or laws of Texas or of the United States was inadmissible.28 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in his concurring opinion stated that, although he thought that evidence
obtained by the method adopted in the Schwartz case was in violation of the United
States Constitution, within the meaning of the Texas statute, the Texas Court was
bound to follow the previous decisions of the Supreme Court, which were to the
effect that there was no constitutional violation. Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent
said that, although prior decisions of the Supreme Court point to aflirmance of the
Texas Court below, it was his opinion that there was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, but, since Texas had the statute, it would not be necessary to decide
whether the Fourth Amendment applied to the states.2 9 He stated that he could
not "remain silent and bow to the precedents that sanction" such practices as allowed
in the present case. Mr. Justice Douglas did not discuss Section 605, but M.r Justice
Frankfurter indicated that he agreed with the majority that Section 605 did not
apply to exclude the evidence in this case.
Although the majority concedes that the introduction of the intercepted
messages would be a violation of 605, Mr. Justice Minton states that the fact
that there is a violation of a federal statute, ". . . in the absence of an expression by
Congress, (is) ... simply an additional factor for a state to consider in formulating
a rule of evidence for use in its own courts. " 3 The Court then cited several state
court decisions which hold that Section 605 does not apply to prohibit state courts
from using such communications as evidence. 31 Perhaps the strongest argument

24. 193 F. 2d 306, 318 (2d Cir. 1951).
25. 318 U.S. 332, 87 L.Ed. 819, 63 Sup. Ct. 608 (1942).
26. 318 U.S. 350, 87 L.Ed. 829, 63 Sup. Ct. 599 (1942).
27. Supra, note 2.
28. Tex. Laws, 1935, Ch. 49, § 1.
29. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 93 L.Ed. 1782, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359 (1949);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 82 L.Ed. 288, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 53 L.Ed. 97, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908); Rowan v. State,
175 Md. 547, 3 A. 2d 753 (1939).
30. Snpra note 1, at p. 160, and at p. 234.
31. Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 A. 2d 706 (1942); People v. Stemmer,
298 N.Y. 728, 83 N.E. 2d 141 (1948); Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296
N.Y. 15, 68 N.E. 2d 854 (1946); People v. Channel, 107 Cal. App. 2d 192, 236 P.
2d 654 (1951).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss2/2
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the court makes may be summed up in one of its sentences: "If Congress is
authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. ' 3
In speculating, prior to the instant case, as to the possibility of Section 605
excluding from state court trials evidence obtained in violation of the section, one
writer 3 stated there were two factors which would leave room for interpreting
Section 605 differently than was done in the instant case: (1) The broad terms
of the statute would seem to indicate that it would apply to all witnesses, including
those in state courts, and (2) that since the bulk of criminal prosecutions are in
state courts, the effect of Section 605 as a protection against invasion of privacy
would be greatly diminished if such evidence was allowed.3' The writer then went
on to point out that although it may be argued Congress cannot validly impose a
restraint on the procedure in a state court, federal laws have done so in certain
instances. 35
However, the important point of the instant case is not what the Supreme
Court could have decided, but what it did decide. What could be the possible effect
of this decision? Prior to this decision there may have been some caution on the
part of state officials in tapping wires for fear of violating Section 605, although
there does not seem to be any prosecutions in the cases of state officers under that law.
Now the officials have a clear field. State officers in those jurisdictions Where there
is no effective statutory prohibition, can go' the full way in this "dirty business"
knowing that the court, fortified by the present decision, will accept the evidence
to convict the man they are after.
Of course, states are free, in interpreting their search and seizure amendment,3o
to rule contrary to the Olmstead case, and hold wire-tapping unconstitutional. In
Missouri, and in many other states, such a ruling would have the effect of keeping
the information out of evidence,37 although prior to the Weeks case, Missouri
followed the common law view of the admissibility of evidence.38 That a state
court would rule contra to the Olmstead case, however, seems doubtful, especially
since wire-tapping in certain cases has been effective in "trapping" criminals. 39
To declare it unconstitutional would mean that it could not be used at all under
any circumstances.
It is unquestionable that there is a serious interference with the right of
32. Supra note 30.
33. Rosenzweig, supra note 15.
34. See supra note 16.
35. Sapra note 15, at page 79, where it is pointed out that testimony in
bankruptcy proceedings cannot be used in subsequent criminal trial, and further
that a state court could not compel a federal agent to divulge official information
in violation of a treasury regulation prohibiting such divulgence.
36. In Missouri the constitutional provision is Art. I, § 15. All states now have
a similar constitutional provision.
37. State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 159 S.W. 2d 794 (1942); State v. Owens,
302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100 (1924); People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112
(1924); State v. Gooder, 57 S.D. 619, 234 N.W. 610 (1930); for the rules followed
in the various states see Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 29.
38. State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489, 497, 32 S.W. 1002 (1895).
39. bySee
supra note
16. School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1953
Published
University
of Missouri
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privacy when one, without apparent effective hindrance (and even perhaps in
cases where there may be a hindrance), may intercept another's communications.
It is arguable that wire-tapping is an effective (and thus desirable) means of catching certain types of criminals and of thwarting crime. But is this sufficient to allow
its indiscriminate use by police officials? Heed should be given to Mr. Justice
Brandeis's words in his dissent in the Olmstead case: "The progress of science in
furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with
wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home." 40 The words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in the On Lee case 4"
should also be in our thoughts: "Of course criminal prosecution is more than a game.
But in any event it should not be deemed to be a dirty game in which the 'dirty
business' of criminals is outwitted by 'the dirty business' of law officers. The contrast between morality professed .by society and immorality practiced on its behalf
makes for contempt of law. Respect for law cannot be turned off and on as though it
42
were a hotwater faucet"
As long as it seems that wire-tapping will not be declared unconstitutional,
and as long as it seems that Section 605 will not be applied to the states, what is to
be done? States must take action to protect the basic rights of their citizens.
New York was the first state to attempt a solution by providing for
supervised wire-tapping. 43 Its statute provides for ex parte orders by the court,
where there is sufficient grounds, to an officer to tap the wires. However, since New
York follows the common law rule as to the admissibility of evidence, 44 the act is
notoriously deficient in that it does not provide that evidence obtained without
adhering to the terms of the act would be disallowed in a trial. There was a bill
before the Missouri Legislature45 patterned to a degree after the New York act.
However, the Missouri bill would have made the interception of messages a felony
with a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and a fine of not more than
one thousand dollars; it would also have allowed recovery of the sum of one thousand dollars from the violator by the person whose communications were illegally
intercepted, this amount to have been in addition to any actual damage which
may have been proved in a civil trial. The bill might have been further strengthened,
perhaps, by affirmatively providing that the evidence obtained in violation of the
act be excluded from a trial, and that the forfeiture of the thousand dollars be not
dependent upon prior conviction of the defendant in a criminal proceeding.
However, on March 10, 1953, the Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence recommended a substitute bill, Senate Bill 198 (which now seems destined to die). The
40. Supra note 12, at p. 474.
41. Supra note 23.
42.

At pages 758-759 of the official report.

43. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROCED. § 813-a (1942).
44. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.D. 585 (1926).
45. S.B. No. 198, 67th General Assembly (1953), read for the first time
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss2/2
Feb. 11, 1953.
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substitute bill provides that "It shall be unlawful for any person to intercept or
direct the interception of any telegraphic or telephonic communication within this
state." The sanctions are the same as was provided in the original Senate Bill 198,
but it further states that "Any evidence obtained in violation of this act will not
be admissible in evidence in any cause whatsoever." This provision carries out the
suggestion above and restates the present Missouri law. However, it is not clear
whether the recovery of the one thousand dollars by the party whose message was
intercepted is dependent upon a prior criminal conviction.46
The difficulty of completely outlawing wire-tapping may arise in the enforcement of the provision. For instance, a law enforcement officer may find it impossible
to obtain the proper evidence to convict a person who he is certain is violating a
law. The officer, notwithstanding the act, may use wire-tapping, relying upon his
friendship and association with the prosecuting attorney to prevent prosecution. A
prosecutor would tend to be more sympathetic and understanding with the officer's
position where no method was available than where there was a lawful provision
which was violated by the officer. 47 The question may then be: Is it more desirable
to have a limited lawfully supervised method or a prohibition which might in certain
instances be effectively circumvented? Of course, even where a limited provision is
available, there would be no insurance that an officer would not first tap the wires
to get some evidence, and then apply to the court for the ex parte order, and at
the trial only use the evidence obtained after the order issued. However, it may be
that the Senate Committee substitute for Senate Bill 198, by providing the sanctions
outlined above, will effectively deter any officer from being tempted to violate
the act.
Thus three courses are available to settle, or at least to clarify, the wire-tapping
problem within the states: (1) permit indiscriminate wire-tapping and allow
evidence to be admitted at the trial; (2) completely prohibit wire-tapping, with
effective sanctions against violators, including the disallowance of the evidence at
a trial; (3) supervise wire-tapping along the lines of the New York act or the
original Senate Bill 198. Few, if any, would advocate the first course, but arguments
4s
can be made for either the second or third.
If one is of the opinion that a state's hands should not be tied in seeking out
criminals, then the solution is supervised wire-tapping. One, however, who would
rather see some criminals go free than have one person's privacy invaded would
advocate complete prohibition of wire-tapping. The course to be followed is for the
legislature to determine.
BERNARD SILVERMAN

46. For a classification of the statutes which the various states have enacted
on wire-tapping and communications see Rosenzweig, supra note 15, pp. 73 et. seq.
(footnotes 174 through 186 indusive). From a cursory glance at some of the
statutes, it seems that Substitute Senate Bill 198 (67 Mo. Ge. Assembly) provides
the most effective sanctions.
47. No prosecutions of law enforcements officers have been found under
Section 605 nor under Section 501 (which provides the penalty for violation of
Section 605).
48. For the arguments which may be made for each position see Rosenzweig,
supra note
15, pp. of90-98.
Published
by University
Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1953
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LIABILITY INSURER'S UNREASONABLE REFUSAL TO SETTLE CLAIM

In the recent case of Zumwalt v. Utilities IRsurance Co.' the assured, plaintiffs
in this action, were defendants in a prior suit by B who was injured as a result of
the assured's negligence. This first suit was for $40,000 damages, and the assured
was insured to the extent of $10,000. B offered to settle first for $8,500 and later
for $6,500, both sums less than the face amount of the policy. The insurer offered
to settle for $4,500. It did not offer more because the second $5,000 was reinsured
and the reinsurers apparently would not pay anything. The insurer told the assured
that if the assured would pay $2,500 the case could be settled. There was testimony
that the insurer thought the case could be won. The first. case was tried and B
secured a judgment for $15,000.2 The assured was allowed in the later action to
recover from the insurer the entire amount of the judgment on the ground of the
insurer's bad faith in refusing to settle the claim.
Ihe court discussed two possible actions which an assured may have against
its liability or indemnity insurer for refusing to settle a claim. First, a tort action
against the insurer for failing to settle a claim within the policy limit when by reason
of such failure the assured becomes liable to the claimant for an amount in excess of
the policy. Second, an action upon the contract of insurance for a loss suffered by
the assured which the insurer refuses to pay. Ordinarily there is no action on the
contract itself for the insurer's refusal to settle with a third person.3
I. TORT THEORY

OF RECOVERY

Settlements of claims are of two types: either the assured settles with claimant
or insurer settles with claimant who may be the assured or a third person to whom
assured has become liable. Usually a liability or indemnity policy reserves to the
insurer the exclusive right to settle any claim against the assured. Settlement by
the assured without prior consent of the insurer releases the latter from liability
on the policy.4 Thus, the insurer has the sole right, but not necessarily a duty, to
settle claims asserted against the assured.6 "The mere refusal of an insurer to settle
a claim for an amount within the policy limits does not, of itself, render the
insurer liable for the amount by which a subsequent judgment exceeds the policy
limits."6
1. 360 Mo., 362, 228 S.W. 2d 750 (1950).
2. Burneson v. Zumwalt Co., 349 Mo. 94, 159 S.W. 2d 605 (1942).
3. Best Building Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451,
160 N.E. 911, 71 A.L.R. 1464 (1928); Note, 3 Miss. L. J. 334 (1931); Note, 34
A.L.R. 750 (1925), supplemented in 37 A.L.R. 1484 (1925), 43 A.L.R. 329 (1926),
71 A.L.R. 1486 (1931), 131 A.L.R. 1500 (1941).
4. Thacher v. Aetna Accident and Liability Co. of Hartford, Conn., 287
Fed. 484, 28 A.L.R. 1280 (8th Cir. 1923); 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4714 (1942).

5. City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643
(1929); Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577, 28
A.L.R. 1284 (1923). The insurer may not settle for more than the policy limit
and bind the assured without assured's consent. 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4711 (1942).
6. 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4711 (1942).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss2/2
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As the assured may settle with a claimant as to the amount of a claim which
exceeds the policy,7 it can be argued that the assured should not be allowed any
tort action against the insurer in the event of the insurer's refusal to settle. Certainly no such action should be permitted where the insurer's refusal or failure to
settle is a result of an honest belief that the assured was not liable or that the settlement would be greatly in excess of recoverable damages.8 If the settlement is close to
the limit of liability of the insurer, it may refuse to settle, taking a chance on not
having to pay anything by successfully defending the suit, or at least having to pay
but little more than the settlement. Though it has been said that the insurer has
an option whether to settle, courts geiterally impose some sort of obligation on the
insurer to attempt to settle the claim. If the assured can show the insurer to be
guilty of negligence or bad faith, the insurer may be held liable for the entire amount
of the judgment against assured. Courts are split as to whether negligence or bad
faith is the proper rule in determining the insurer's liability. Some courts say that
the insurer does owe a duty to the assured and that the insurer may breach such
duty by negligence. 9 It has been said that ". . . a good faith decision on the part of
the insurance company upon the question of settlement must be preceded by the
exercise of that degree of care and diligence which a man of ordinary care and
prudence would exercise in the investigation and adjustment of claims. . ...10
Courts which will not allow recovery due to mere negligence of the insurer
will generally allow recovery if the assured can show the insurer guilty of bad faith.-1
Many courts have insisted that the rule of bad faith is the better rule.'. Which rule
is the majority rule is doubtful,'13 but Missouri clearly adopted the bad faith rule
in the instant case. 14 The court, speaking through Tipton, J., said,
"We have reviewed many authorities on the question and think the weight
of authority is that where the insurer in a liability policy reserves the
exclusive right to contest or settle any claim brought against the assured,
and prohibits him from voluntarily assuming any liability or settling any
claims without the insurer's consent, except at his own costs, and the
provisions of the policy provide that the insurer may compromise or settle
7. General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Louisville Home Telephone
Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S.W. 1031, 1917D L.R.A. 952 (1917).
8. Mendota Electric Co. v. N.Y. Indemnity Co., 169 Minn. 377, 211 N.W.
317 (1926), .rsubsequent appeal in175 Minn. 181, 221 N.W. 61 (1928).
9. Douglas v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 384, 127 At. 708,
37 A.L.R. 1477 (1924). See cases in note 30, 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND
PRACTICE § 4713 (1942); Note, 30 B.U.L. REv. 550 (1950); Note, 18 B.U.L. REv.
235 (1938); Comment, 40 YALE L.J. 979 (1931); Note, 34 A.L.R. 750 to 758 (1925),
n. 3, supra.
10. Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co. of Ft. Scott, Kansas, 204 Wis. 1,
235 N.W. 413 (1931).
11. Per Fead, J., writing minority opinion inWakefield v. Globe Indemnity
Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929); McCombs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of N.Y., 231 Mo. App. 1206, 89 S.W. 2d 114 (1935).
12. Best Building Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160
N.E. 911, 71 A.L.R. 1464 (1928).
13.

8

APPLEMAN,

INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§

4712, 4713 (1942); 30

B.U.L. REv. 550 (1950); 3 Miss. L.J. 334 (1931).
14. Citing McCombs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 231 Mo. App.
1206, 89byS.W.
2d 114
(1935). School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1953
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such a claim within the policy limits, no action will lie against the insurer
for the amount of the judgment recovered against the insured in excess
of the policy limits, unless the insurer is guilty of fraud or bad faith in
refusing to settle a claim within the limits of the policy. There are cases
that hold that the insured is entitled to recover upon proof that the
insurer in refusing to settle a claim for damages was guilty of negligence.
But this test is rejected in the better reasoned cases and we think rightly
Courts which purport to follow the negligence rule tend to define negligence
in terms of or used in connection with bad faith.16 Courts which are supposed to
adhere to the bad faith rule often speak of insurer's duty to consider settlement
without bad faith.' 7 The difference between the two theories may be slight as to
result obtained.
II. CONTRACT THEORY OF RECOVERY
As recognized in the opinion in the instant case, 18 recovery against the
insurer may be upon a contract theory only in the situation of the assured suffering
a loss and the insurer refusing to pay the assured. The assured, may, of course,
sue the insurer on the contract of liability or indemnity insurance upon proof of
a valid claim for the amount owed to the assured. At Common Law, no damages
above legal interest were recoverable though the insurer withheld money due the
assured. 19 However, Missouri has had for many years a statute which allows the
assured to collect up to an additional ten per cent of the loss plus reasonable
attorney's fees if he can show that the insurer "vexatiously" refused payment. 20
15. 360.Mo. 362 at 370, 228 S.W. 2d 750 at 753 (1950).
16. Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., supra, n. 10.
17. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Const. Co., 69 F. 2d 462 at 464
(8th Cir. 1934) ("a duty owing to the insured to exercise skill and care and good
faith to the end of saving the insured harmless"); Boling v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co., 173 Okla. 160 (1935) ("an abandonment of this duty to act subsequent to its assumption in part constituted bad faith.").
18. 360 Mo. 362 at 373, 228 S.W. 2d 750 at 756 (1950).
19. New Orleans Ins. Co. v. Piaggio, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 378, 21 L.Ed. 358
(1873). See 6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE c. 172, on right to recover
interest.
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 375.420 (1949). Damages in addition to claim. "In any
action against any insurance company to recover the amount of any loss under a
policy of fire, cyclone, lightning, life, health, accident, employers' liability, burglary,
theft, embezzlement, fidelity, indemnity, marine or other insurance, if it appear
from the evidence that such company has vexatiously refused to pay such loss,
the court or jury may, in addition to the amount thereof and interest, allow the
plaintiff damages not to exceed ten per cent on the amount of the loss and a
reasonable attorney's fee; and the court shall enter judgment for the aggregate
sum found in the verdict." From G.S. 1865, p. 402, § 1; Laws 1899, p. 254; Laws 1911,
p. 282. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 375.420 (1949) (historical note). Missouri Laws,
1951, p. 280, extend these provisions to insurers not licensed to do business within
the state, as follows: "In any action, suit or other proceeding instituted against
any insurance company, association or other insurer upon any contract of insurance
issued or delivered in this state to a resident of this state, or to a corporation incorporated in or authorized to do business in this state, if such insurer has failed or
refused for a period of thirty days after due demand therefor prior to the institution
of such action, suit or other proceeding, to make payment under and in accordance
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss2/2
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The instant case holds that this applies only to actions based on the contract
of insurance. As only the assured can suffer a loss under the policy, it is "applicable
only to a suit by a policy holder against his insurer."21 "The obvious purpose of
the statute . .. is to correct the evil of an arbitrary refusal for the sole purpose
of delaying the plaintiff in collection of his claim ... ,,2

Compromise and settlement are involved under this statute only in instances of
the insurer's vexatious refusal to settle with the assured as to amount of loss 23 or

where the insurer refuses to pay the beneficiary of a life insurance policy for reasons
24
considered by the court as not necessarily those of good faith.
It is frequently emphasized that the statute is highly penal and must be
strictly construed,2 5 and it has not been construed to include all insurance com27
panies. 2 Neither are all types of insurance included.
"The word 'Vexatiously,' as used in the insurance statute, has often been
with the terms and provisions of such contract of insurance, and it shall appear
from the evidence that such refusal was vexatious and without reasonable cause,
the court or jury may, in addition to the amount due, under the provisions of
said contract of insurance and interest thereon, allow the plaintiff damages for such
vexatious refusal to pay and attorneys fees as provided in section 375.420. Failure
of an insurer to appear and defend any such action, suit or other proceeding shall
be deemed prima facie evidence that its failure to make payment was vexatious
and without reasonable cause." Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 375.168 (1949). The following section makes some exceptions of types of insurance. See generally 6 APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcricE c. 173, Damages for Refusal of Payment.

21. Corder v. Morgan Roofing Co., 355 Mo. 127, 195 S.W. 2d 441 (1946).
22. Bouligny v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 179 S.W. 2d 109 at 112 (Mo. App.
1944).
23. Patterson v. American Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 174 Mo. App. 37, 160
S.W. 59 (1913).
24. Friedman v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co. of Worcester, Mass., 108 S.W.
2d 156 (Mo. App. 1937); Butler v. Missouri Ins. Co., 187 S.W. 2d 56 (Mo. App.
1945).
25. Aufrichtig v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 298 Mo. 1, 249 S.W. 912
(1923); Mears Mining Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 162 Mo. App. 178, 144 S.W.
883 (1912); Miller v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 206 Mo. App. 475, 229 S.W. 261 (1921);
Mangelsorf v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co., 224 Mo. App. 265, 26 S.W. 2d 818 (1930).
26. Sappington v. St Joseph Town Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 77 Mo. App. 270
(1898) (holding that this section did not apply to a town mutual fire insurance
company); Olsen v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 205 Mo. App. 260, 224
S.W. 129 (1920) (holding a fraternal benefit society not liable under this section);
Schmidt v. Central Mutual Ins. Ass'n., 153 S.W. 2d 99 (Mo. App. 1941) holding a
mutual assessment insurance company is exempt. (See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.310
(1949)).
27. Mears Mining Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra n. 25, held that prior
to amendment, this section did not include indemnity insurance. Sprinkler leakage
insurance was not included, Mangelsdorf v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co., supra n. 25; nor
was a supersedeas bond, Grover v. Aetna Accident & Liability Co., 200 S.W. 441
(Mo. App. 1918). A bond that indemnified school district for damages arising from
contractor's default was held to be within the statute, Camdenton Consol. School
Dist. No. 6 of Camden County ex rel. W. H. Powell Lumber Co. v. N. Y. Casualty
Co., 340 Mo. 1070, 104 S.W. 2d 319 (1937). This was based on an earlier case that
held a corporation licensed and doing a bonding business for profit and bond
executed by that company as surety to be within the statute, State ex rel. Elberta
Peach and Land Co. v. Chicago Bonding & Surety Co., 279 Mo. 535, 215 S.W. 20
(1919) by(full
discussion
of problem).
Published
University
of Missouri
School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1953], Art. 2
196

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

defined by the decisious of this court, and has come to have an established meaning,
viz., without reasonable, or probable, cause or excuse." 28 Whether the insurer has
been guilty of vexatious refusal to pay is usually regarded as a question of fact to be
2
determined by the jury.

9

It is frequenly added that the vexatious delay must occur before trial and
must be judged by the facts as they appeared to the insurer before the trial.30
Of course, the insurer is not necessarily liable for the penalties merely because
the judgment is for the assured. If the statute applied automatically, it would be
unconstitutional "for it is only on the fundamental ground of a vexatious refusal
to pay that the penalty can be upheld." 3' The insurer is allowed certain defenses
to show itself not guilty of vexatious delay. The basic defense is the insurer's
belief that it had a valid defense to the claim of the assured. 32
The insurer is not liable for vexatious delay if there is reasonable doubt of
the validity of the claim,83 or a serious question as to method of arriving at the
cash value of the property,34 or the question of law involved in the construction of
the policy is an open question. 35 However, there are decisions that "the mere
28. Block v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 316 Mo. 278 at 305, 290 S.W.
429 at 441 (1926) (en banc). Similar definitions are found in other decisions such
as "willful and without reasonable cause," Bouligny v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
.rupra n. 22; Bonzon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 143 S.W. 2d 336 (Mo. App.
1940); Trantham v. Home Ins. Co. of N.Y., 137 S.W. 2d 690 (Mo. App. 1940).
29. Brown v. Railway Passenger Assurance Co., 45 Mo. 221 (1870).
30. Bouligny v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra n. 22; Buffalo Ins. Co. v.
Bommarito, 42 F. 2d 53 (8th Cir. 1930), 70 A.L.R. 1211.
31. Non-Royalty Shoe Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., Ltd. of London, England,
277 Mo. 399, 210 S.W. 37 (1918).
32. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 114 F. 2d 526, 536 (8th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied 61 Sup. Ct. 141, 85 L.Ed. 455 (1940) summarized nine principles in
connection with this statute: (The first six are credited to Non-Royalty Shoe Co.
v. Phoenix Assurance Companyy "(1) The refusal must be vexatious. (2) The
defendant is to be allowed an honest difference of opinion as to its liability. (3) The
defendant is to be allowed to litigate that difference. (4) (Unless the foregoing
latitude of action be allowed to the defendant, the statute would be unconstitutional.) (5) No penalty can be inflicted unless the evidence shows two things:
First, that the refusal was willful and, secondly, that it was without reasonable
cause; and these things must appear to a reasonable and prudent man before the
trial. (6) The adverse outcome of a trial is no reason for inflicting the penalty.
In Aufrichtig v. Columbia National Life Ins. Co., 298 Mo. 1, 249 S.W. 912 (1923),
the Supreme Court added the following principle: (7) If the insurance company
acts in good faith it may contest an issue of either fact or law without the danger
of penalties. This further principle is announced in State ex rel. Continental Life
Ins. Co. v. Allen, 303 Mo. 608, 262 S.W. 43 [19241 (8) The right to resist payment
is, primarily, a question of law to be determined by the facts as they reasonably
appeared before trial, and not as they may have been found by the jury. Later,
the following principle was announced in State ex rel. Gott v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
317 Mo. 1078, loc. cit. 1095, 298 S.W. 83 [19271. (9) Where the legal question
involved is one about which lawyers might well differ, there can be no vexatious
delay. See, also, Camdenton Consol. School Dist. No. 6 v. New York Casualty Co.,
340 Mo. 1070, 104 S.W. 2d 319 [19373."
33. Patterson v. American Ins. Co., sitpra n. 23.
34. Sun. Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Rupp; Rupp v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 64 F. Supp.
533 (W.D. Mo. 1946).
35. Mound City Roofing Tile Co. v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 218
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss2/2
Mo. App. 395, 277 S.W. 349 (1925).

12

et al.: Masthead and Comments
1953]

COMMENTS

presence of a real law question in the record will not of itself exculpate the
defendant from a charge of wilful obstruction if there is evidence that its
38
attitude was vexatious and recalcitrant." Thus it would seem that clear evidence
of the insurer's bad faith may constitute vexatious refusal to pay even though the
insurer regarded the matter as an unsettled question of law. Denial of liability
without stating any ground for denial has been deemed sufficient evidence to
37
warrant submission of vexatious refusal to the jury.
The plaintiff has the burden of proof of the insurer's vexatious refusal to pay
loss. However, as to the degree of proof, it is stated that "direct and positive
39
evidence of insurer's vexatious refusal to pay is not required" or that formal
affirmative proof is not required. 40 In addition to deciding whether the insurer
has been guilty of a vexatious refusal to pay loss, the jury decides the amount of
the assured's attorney's fees (if vexatious delay is found) for which testimony as
1
Award by the jury of ten
to the reasonable value of services is admissible.
42
per cent damages on interest allowed on the assured's actual loss was improper.
43
The penalty is, of course, on the amount of loss, not the amount of policy coverage.
R. W. LILLARD
38

36. Lemay Ferry Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 347 Mo. 793, 802,
149 S.W. 2d 328, 331 (1941), citing Non-Royalty Shoe Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co.,
supra n. 33; Fay v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 268 Mo. 373, 388, 187 S.W. 861, 865 (1916);
Young v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co., 269 Mo. 1, 21, 187 S.W. 856, 861 (1916).
37. Block v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., note 28 supra; Reed v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 90, 73 S.W. 2d 1027 (1934); Bennett v. National Fire Ins.
Co., 235 Mo. App. 720, 729, 143 S.W. 2d 479,482 (1940).
38. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. of Milwaukee v. Commercial Bank, 39 F. 2d 826
(8th Cir. 1930); or insurer's bad faith, Schaeffer v. Northern Assur. Co., 177 S.W.
2d 688 (Mo. App. 1944).
39. Wiener v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 61 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Mo. 1945).
40. Brown v. Railway Passenger Assur. Co., 45 Mo. 221 (1870); Lockwood
v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 50 (1870); Blackwell v. American Central Ins.
Co., 80 Mo. App. 75 (1899).
41. John v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 100 S.W. 2d 936 (Mo.
App. 1936). The amount of attorney's fees may exceed value of policy, Buchholz
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 177 Mo. App. 683, 160 S.W. 573 (1913). The jury
may award an attorney's fee but refuse to award the ten per cent additional
recovery though vexatious delay is found, Evans v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co.,
237 Mo. App. 317, 167 S.W. 2d 118 (1942).
42. Gosnell v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n. of Camden, N.J., 109 S.W. 2d 59 (Mo.
App. 1937); Kyle v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 244 S.W. 2d 418 (Mo. App.
1951).
43. City of Aurora v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 180 Mo. App. 263, 165 S.W. 357
(1914).
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